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Abstract 
The current study aimed to clarify the nature of the processes underlying working 
memory updating. In a series of four experiments using the n-back paradigm, the authors 
demonstrate that continuous updating of items in working memory prevents strong 
binding of those items to working memory, and hence leads to an increased susceptibility 
to proactive interference. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that this interference 
reflects a competition between a fast and automatic process that reveals the degree of 
familiarity of an item, and a controlled, context-sensitive recollection process that 
depends on the strength of bindings between the item and working memory. Experiment 
3 further clarifies the origins of this interference by demonstrating that even items that are 
semantically related to the updated working memory contents, but that have not been 
maintained in working memory before, cause proactive interference during updating. 
Finally, the results of Experiment 4 indicate that this interference is controlled through 
top-down behavioral adjustments that prioritize recollection over familiarity-assessment. 
The implications of these findings for the construct validity of the n-back task, for the 
control processes involved in working memory updating, and for the concept of executive 
control more generally, are discussed. 
Keywords: working memory, updating, proactive interference, interference control, 
executive control, binding, recollection, familiarity, n-back 
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Introduction 
Working memory is a theoretical construct that refers to the structures and processes 
underlying the temporary retention and manipulation of information, in support of higher 
cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 1986; Miyake & Shah, 1999). One typical feature of working 
memory is that its capacity is limited in the sense that only a reduced amount of 
information can be kept in an active, directly accessible state at any time (e.g., Cowan, 
2005). Therefore, when confronted with a stream of information that exceeds the capacity 
limits, a person is restricted to temporarily store subsets of the information and to 
successively update those representations as new information becomes available. Very 
often however, it then becomes hard to distinguish older from the more recent 
information, a behavioral phenomenon which can be referred to as proactive interference 
(e.g., Jonides & Nee, 2006). In what follows, we will first introduce the theoretical 
concept of updating, and then focus on the involvement of cognitive interference in 
updating. 
 
Memory Updating, Interference, and the n-back task 
Updating is defined as the act of modifying the current status of representations in 
memory to accommodate new input (Morris & Jones, 1990). It is widely believed to be a 
key component of executive or cognitive control (e.g., Collette & Van der Linden, 2002; 
Kessler & Meiran, 2006, 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & 
Wager, 2000). This view relies on a unitary, phenomenal definition of the concept of 
updating; however, this does not say much about the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
updating (Buzsáki, 2006; Kessler & Meiran, 2006, 2008; Szmalec, Demanet, 
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Vandierendonck, & Verbruggen, 2009). A number of recent studies have attempted to 
gain an insight into the cognitive processes underlying working memory updating. 
Kessler and Meiran (2008) argued for the existence of two dissociable component 
processes of working memory updating. The first one is a local process, which is 
responsible for modifying the relevant representations in memory. The second one is a 
global process, which is responsible for stabilizing the representations in memory after 
the modification took place. The global process protects the contents of working memory 
against interference. Similarly, Bunting, Cowan and Saults (2006) argued that subjects 
adjust strategies to diminish interference during updating when sufficient time is 
available between the presentation of successive items. They used the running memory 
span task as a measure of updating (Pollack, Johnson & Knaft, 1959; Morris & Jones, 
1990). In this task, subjects are presented with a list of consonants of unknown length. 
They are required to remember a specified number (n) of the most recently presented 
consonants in serial order. This implies that, while the task proceeds and new items are 
presented, the subjects have to update the memorized string of n most recent items: they 
need to drop the oldest item in the string and add the most recent one. Occasionally, the 
presentation of items is interrupted and subjects are required to recall the n most recent 
items stored in memory. Bunting and his colleagues (2006) proposed that subjects use 
two different strategies to perform the running memory span task, depending on the pace 
(fast or slow) at which the items are presented. At a fast presentation pace, items are 
retrieved with relatively low cognitive effort, based on their recency. At a slow pace, 
items need to be rehearsed in order to preserve the memory contents. This makes the 
slow-paced version a more demanding version of the running memory span task, on the 
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basis of which Bunting et al. argued that only the slow-paced version of the task 
measures updating (see also Palladino & Jarrold, 2008). Although this does not directly 
following from their data, Bunting et al. proposed that this rehearsal strategy is 
particularly aimed in particular at reducing interference. More direct evidence about the 
role of interference control in updating was drawn from a series of experiments that used 
a choice reaction time task that involves updating of response representations (Szmalec & 
Vandierendonck, 2007; Szmalec et al., 2009). Combined, these studies suggest that that 
the frequent updating of response representations stored in working memory, elicits 
interference amongst those representations. 
 
Despite the fact that an increasing number of theorists assume that interference occurs 
during updating, the precise nature of this interference, and particularly how the cognitive 
system deals with it, remains unclear. Therefore, the aim of this study is to clarify how 
updating produces interference and how this interference is dealt with. To this end, we 
used the n-back paradigm, which offers a measure of working memory updating  (e.g., 
Collette & Van der Linden, 2002; Oberauer, 2005).  The classical n-back task (e.g., Smith 
& Jonides, 1997) is a recognition task, which requires subjects to determine whether each 
item (e.g., letter) in a list matches the item that was presented n positions before (an 
example of a 2-back match is F−B−L−B; an example of a 2-back mismatch is 
F−G−L−B). Therefore, they are required to remember a specified number (n) of the most 
recently presented items in serial order (n-back). While the task evolves and new items 
are presented, the subjects have to update the memorized string of n most recent items: 
they need to drop the oldest item in the string and add the most recent one. Interference 
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occurs in the n-back task on so-called lure trials. An example of an n+1 lure trial in a 2-
back task is B−F−L−B (i.e., a no-longer relevant item corresponds to the currently 
presented item), an n-1 lure in a 2-back task is L−F−B−B (i.e., a not-yet relevant item 
corresponds to the currently presented item). Such trials show that when a newly 
presented item does not match the n-back item but one of the positional neighbours of the 
n-back item (i.e. in n+ or n- position), subjects are slower and make more errors (e.g., 
Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 
2007; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2005). This nicely illustrates the idea that continuously 
updating items in working memory makes it hard to distinguish the position of those 
items in working memory, resulting in cognitive interference or conflict. 
 
The present study 
The experiments reported in the present study were designed to test the hypothesis that 
interference during updating reflects a competition between the assessment of the 
familiarity of an item in memory and the explicit recollection of that item, and that this 
interference is counteracted by prioritizing recollection over familiarity. Familiarity-
matching and recollection were initially presented as two processes involved in 
recognition from long-term memory (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). However, both 
processes are currently believed to also allow access to information in working memory 
(e.g., Goethe & Oberauer, 2008; Oztekin & McElree, 2007), and to be responsible for 
proactive interference in working memory (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Oberauer, 2005). 
According to dual-task models of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002), both the 
assessment of familiarity of a stimulus and the recollection of detailed information about 
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previous events are two dissociable processes that operate in parallel during item 
recognition. Assessment of familiarity is believed to be a relatively fast and automatic 
process that initiates prior to recollection, and merely relies on the identity and activation 
of a representation in memory. By contrast, recollection is assumed to be a consciously 
controlled, effortful and analytic search process that is slower compared to familiarity 
matching, and involves the positional context in which an item was previously 
encountered. Applied to the n-back task, this means that an item that was presented 
shortly before will elicit a familiarity signal but this familiarity signal will not allow 
differentiating whether this item is in the target n-back position or whether it is just a 
neighboring item of the target. On non-lure trials, it will be possible to react fast and 
accurately based on the familiarity signal only. However, on lure trials, the familiarity 
signal will fire ("the item has been encountered previously") but the recollection process 
is needed to override the misleading activation from the familiarity process by also 
providing contextual evidence ("but it is not in the n-back position"). Thus, the lure effect 
would reflect interference between familiarity matching and recollection (cf. Oberauer, 
2005). In what follows, we will explain how the process of working memory updating 
influences this balance between familiarity and recollection, or in other words, how these 
lure interference effects are assumed to interact with the updating demands involved in 
the n-back task. Our theoretical elaborations are principally based on a model which 
defines working memory as the activated part of long-term memory within a region of 
direct access (DA) where information is maintained in a directly accessible state 
(Oberauer, 2009; see also Cowan, 1988, 1995). 
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As elaborated above, the dual-process model of recognition in the n-back updating task 
assumes that the lure-interference effect is driven by the familiarity of the lure item, 
whereas the correct rejection of that lure depends on explicit recollection from memory. 
In short-term memory recognition, recollection is the retrieval of items from (the DA 
region of) working memory. This recollection is assumed to rely on strong bindings 
between memory items and their list contexts [clarify what you mean by list contexts] 
(Oberauer, 2005). The quality of recollection will thus directly depend on the strength of 
the binding of an item to working memory. Pure maintenance tasks like the Sternberg 
memory task for example (Sternberg, 1966), allow a strong binding of contents to 
working memory, hence providing strong recollection to overcome proactive 
interference. Updating tasks however, require flexible binding and unbinding, resulting in 
weaker bindings of items to working memory. Oberauer (2009) describes this as follows: 
"This class of updating tasks is interesting because they focus on a fundamental 
dilemma of WM, to strike the balance between holding on to representations and 
replacing them by new ones" (p.70) . Because weaker bindings diminish the strength of 
the recollection process, updating tasks are assumed to be particularly vulnerable to 
proactive interference. 
 
Four experiments are reported in the present paper. Experiments 1 and 2 test the 
hypothesis that n-back lure interference reflects a competition between the assessment of 
the familiarity of an item in working memory and the explicit recollection of that item. 
Experiment 3 further clarifies the origins of the lure interference effects by demonstrating 
that even memory contents that have themselves not been maintained in working memory 
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before, also have the potential to cause proactive interference in the n-back task, merely 
through semantic relatedness to the items that are continuously updated. Finally, 
Experiment 4 tests the hypothesis that lure interference is controlled by a top-down 
mechanism prioritizing recollection over familiarity processing.  
 
Experiment 1a 
Starting from the hypothesis that lure interference reflects a competition between 
familiarity assessment and recollection, we investigated the effect of different kinds of n-
back lure trials in Experiment 1a. We compared the detrimental effects of lures in the n+ 
and n- positions. An n+ lure trial (e.g., B−F−L−B in a 2-back task) reflects interference 
from an old item that is not relevant anymore to the task and that is therefore being 
discarded from memory. An n- lure trial (e.g., L−F−B−B) reflects interference from an 
item that is still relevant to the task. Although both n+ and n- lures cause proactive 
interference, at the time of interference the n- lure item must still be kept activated in 
working memory for future processing, whereas the n+ lure item is allowed to degrade
1
. 
The different kinds of lure interference that were used, expressed as a function of the set 
size (n = 1, 2, or 3), are displayed in Figure 1.  
In the 1-back variant of the task, two n+ lures were used, namely one in the 2-back (i.e., 
n+1) and one in the 3-back position (i.e., n+2); by definition, n- lures do not occur in a 1-
back task. The comparison of n+1 and n+2 lures enables us to estimate how proactive 
interference in the n-back task evolves over time. We hypothesize that the familiarity of 
an item that has become irrelevant to the task will decrease over time, reducing the 
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conflict between familiarity and recollection. We therefore predict that n+2 lures will 
cause less interference than n+1 lures.  
In the 2-back variant of the task, one n- lure (i.e., in the 1-back position) and one n+ lure 
(i.e., in the 3-back position) were used. The comparison of n-1 and n+1 lures enables us 
to estimate interference caused by items that are no longer relevant and items that are 
relevant for future processing. We hypothesize that the familiarity signal associated with 
the still relevant item will be stronger and hence its competition with recollection will be 
greater. We therefore predict that in a 2-back task, a lure in the n-1 (i.e. 1-back) position 
will produce more interference than a lure in the n+1 position (i.e. 3-back).  
Finally, the 3-back variant of the n-back task includes two lures of the type n-, namely 
one in the n-1 (i.e. 2-back) position and one in the n-2 (i.e. 1-back) position. Items in both 
these positions are relevant for future processing, so they need to be temporarily 
maintained in working memory before arriving in target n-back position. In order to 
maintain items readily accessible, subjects typically rehearse those items (e.g., Page & 
Norris, 1998). Because items in the 2-back position are temporarily older than items in 
the 1-back position, it can be assumed that 2-back items have been rehearsed more often. 
Maintenance rehearsal increases the familiarity of an item (e.g., Gardiner, Gawlik, 
Richardson-Klavehn, 1994); therefore, we predict that a lure in the 2-back position yields 
stronger familiarity and therefore causes more interference than a lure in the 1-back 
position. 
 
Method 
Subjects and design 
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20 first-year students (16 female; mean age: 19 years, range: 18 – 24 years), enrolled at 
the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University participated for 
course requirements. Each subject performed the three variants of the n-back task (i.e., 1-
back, 2-back and 3-back).  
 
Materials and procedure 
The materials and procedure of Experiment 1 were held as close as possible to Jonides, 
Schumacher, Smith, Lauber, Awh et al. (1997). For each condition of n, three different n-
back lists were constructed. This resulted in nine lists for each subject. Each list consisted 
of 45+n letters (i.e. 46, 47 and 48 in the 1-, 2-, and 3-back variants, respectively), which 
were randomly chosen from the 20 consonants of the alphabet. The consonants were 
presented in upper or lower case in a random fashion, to ensure that subjects matched 
verbal contents and not visual features. The 45 trials in each n-back list contained 15 
match trials (i.e. consonant matched the consonant presented n positions before) and 30 
mismatch trials (i.e. consonant did not match the consonant presented n positions before). 
For each variant of n, 6 of the 30 mismatches were lure trials. In the 1-back variant, three 
lures were in the n+1 position (e.g., G−B−T−B; see Figure 1) and three lures were in the 
n+2 position (e.g., B−G−T−B). For the 2-back variant, three lures were in the n+1 
position (e.g., B−T−G−B) and three lures were in the n-1 position (e.g., G−T−B−B). In 
the 3-back condition, three lures were in the n-1 position (e.g., G−B−T−B) and three lures 
were in the n-2 position (e.g., G−T−B−B). There were no other lures in the list within a 5-
back range from the target item. Furthermore, an item could not be more than one type of 
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lure at the same time (e.g., in the 3-back sequence B-L−F−B−B the consonant B is both 
an n-2 and an n+1 lure). No lures were included on the n-back matching trials. 
The consonants were presented one at a time centered on a 15 inch computer monitor, in 
48 point bold Times New Roman font. Subjects were seated approximately 40 cm from 
the screen. Each consonant remained on the screen for 500 ms, followed by a fixed inter-
stimulus interval of 2500 ms. Subjects were required to indicate as fast and accurately as 
possible whether a presented item matched the one presented n positions before, by 
pressing the left (i.e. mismatch) or right key (i.e. match) on a response box. They were 
not informed about the occurrence of lures. The three conditions of n were administered 
in a counterbalanced order (Latin square). Within each condition of n, the order of the 
three lists was counterbalanced across subjects. Before starting the experimental 
conditions, each subject practiced the three variants of n in blocks of 20 trials. These 
practice blocks, which did not include lures, proceeded until an accuracy level of at least 
80% was reached. 
 
Results 
Mean Differences 
The mean RTs for the three variants of the n-back task are displayed in Figure 2. In each 
condition of n, an analysis of variance was performed on the RTs and accuracies. Note 
that whenever we use the term mismatch trials, we only refer to "neutral" mismatches, 
and not to lure trials, despite of the fact that lure trials are essentially also mismatch trials 
as they also require a "no" response. 
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1-back. RTs differed as a function of the trial type, F(3, 57) = 12.03, np
2
 = .39, p < .001: 
One-back matches were performed faster than mismatches, F(1, 19) = 4.64, np
2
 = .20, p < 
.05. The n+1 lure trials were performed slower than the mismatches, F(1, 19) = 17.16, np
2
 
= .47, p < .001, and the n+2 lure trials, F(1, 19) = 7.32, np
2
 = .28, p < . 01. However, the 
RT difference between n+2 lures and mismatches was not significant, F(1, 19) = 2.70, np
2
 
= .12, p > .10.  
Accuracy also differed as a function of trial type, F(3, 57) = 8.98, np
2
 = .32, p < .001. 
Subjects were less accurate on match (M = .85; SD = .06) than on mismatch trials (M = 
.94; SD = .05), F(1, 19) = 19.72, np
2
 = .51, p < .001. They were also less accurate on the 
n+1 lures (M = .90; SD = .08) than on the mismatch trials, F(1, 19) = 6.48, np
2
 = .25, p < 
.05, but there was no difference in accuracy between the n+2 lures  and the mismatches 
and, F < 1. Accuracy was lower for the n+1 lures than for the n+2 lures (M = .94; SD = 
.08), F(1, 19) = 7.44, np
2
 = .28, p < .05.  
 
2-back. RTs also differed as a function of trial type, F(3, 57) = 5.78, np
2
 = .23, p < .01. 
We observed no difference between the 2-back matches and mismatches, F < 1, but RTs 
were longer for the n+1 lures and the n-1 lures than for the mismatches, F(1, 19) = 4.73, 
np
2
 = .20, p < .05, and, F(1, 19) = 18.47, np
2
 = .49, p < .001, respectively. The RT 
difference between both types of lures shows that the n-1 lures caused a greater delay 
than the n+1 lures, F(1, 19) = 4.24, np
2
 = .18, p = .05.  
Accuracy also differed as a function of trial type, F(3, 57) = 10.64, np
2
 = .36, p < .001. 
The matches (M = .80; SD = .17) were less accurate than the mismatches (M = .90; SD = 
.14), F(1, 19) = 17.86, np
2
 = .48, p < .001. Both the n+1 (M = .71; SD = .23) and n-1 lures 
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(M = .75; SD = .17) yielded lower accuracies than the mismatch trials, F(1, 19) = 18.02, 
np
2
 = .49, p < .001, and, F(1, 19) = 26.89, np
2
 = .59, p < .001, respectively. The difference 
between both kinds of lure trials was not reliable, F < 1.  
 
3-back. In the 3-back variant of the task, RTs also differed as a function of the trial types, 
F(3, 57) = 12.66, np
2
 = .40, p < .001. There were no differences between 3-back matches 
and mismatches, F(1, 19) = 2.02, np
2
 = .10, p > .10, but RTs were longer for the lures in 
the n-1 and lures in the n-2 position than for mismatches, F(1, 19) = 28.42, np
2
 = .60, p < 
.001, and, F(1, 19) = 6.25, np
2
 = .25, p < .05, respectively. Although both lures had an 
adverse effect, subjects were reliably slower when the lure was in the n-1 position than in 
the n-2 position, F(1, 19) = 6.29, np
2
 = .25, p < .05. 
Accuracy in the 3-back task also depended on the trial type, F(3, 57) = 12.95, np
2
 = .40, p 
< .001. We observed that 3-back matches (M = .62; SD = .16) were less accurate than 3-
back mismatches (M = .84; SD = .17), F(1, 19) = 44.26, np
2
 = .70, p < .001. The n-1 lure 
trials (M = .74; SD = .19) were less accurate than the mismatches, F(1, 19) = 7.82, np
2
 = 
.29, p < .05, and also less accurate than the n-2 lure trials (M = .81; SD = .23), F(1, 19) = 
5.87, np
2
 = .24, p < .05. The n-2 lures did not differ reliably from the mismatch trials, F < 
1. 
 
Experiment 1b 
In Experiment 1a, we used verbal memory content. Because the theoretical account of 
our findings does not distinguish between the kind of material that is being updated, we 
evaluated the generalizability of our findings across item modalities. Therefore, subjects 
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in Experiment 1b performed the n-back task (with n ranging from 1 to 3) using 
consonants (i.e., verbal contents) in half of the blocks, and dots presented in a 5 x 5 grid 
(i.e. visuo-spatial contents) in the other half of the blocks. Both versions included lure 
trials.  
 
Method 
Subjects and design 
Sixty students (34 female; mean age: 21 years, range: 17 – 29 years), fifty of which are 
enrolled at the School of Psychology of Flinders University (Australia), and ten of which 
are enrolled at the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University, 
volunteered for participation. The parameter n was manipulated between subjects, which 
means that there were 20 subjects per variant of the n-back task (1-, 2-, and 3-back). Each 
subject performed the task in both the verbal and the visuo-spatial modality. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The verbal-modality condition was the same as in Experiment 1a. In the visuo-spatial 
modality condition, black dots were presented sequentially in a 5 x 5 black grid (see 
Figure 3) and subjects had to indicate whether the dot appeared in the same location as 
the dot presented n positions before. The 5.9 x 5.9 inch grid was centred on the screen, 
with the 0.79 inch diameter black dot occurring in one of the 25 locations in the grid. The 
timing parameters were the same as those that were used in the verbal-modality 
condition. The order of the modality condition was counterbalanced across subjects. Both 
modalities were practiced following the same procedure as in Experiment 1a. Each 
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subject went through 8 lists in the experimental phase, four in the verbal and four in the 
visuo-spatial modality. In all other respects, including the construction of the lure trials, 
the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1a. 
 
Results 
Mean Differences 
The mean RTs for the three variants of the n-back task are displayed in Figure 4 as a 
function of the modality (verbal and visuo-spatial) and the different trial types (match, 
mismatch and lure trials). Table 1 represents the accuracy data for the same conditions. In 
each condition of n, an analysis of variance was performed on the RTs and accuracies in 
order to investigate whether performance on the different trial types (match, mismatch, 
n+1 lure, n+2 lure) depends on the modality of the memory content. 
 
1-back. For the reaction times, we observed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 
57) = 18.72, np
2
 = .50, p < .001. The main effect of modality and the interaction between 
both factors were not significant, both Fs < 1. Power calculations, based on Cohen’s 
(1988) power tables, indicate that the test of difference between the verbal and visuo-
spatial modality was sufficiently powerful to detect a moderate sized effect (power = 
.99). Averaged across the verbal and the visuo-spatial modalities, the matches were 
performed faster than the mismatches, F(1, 19) = 9.74, np
2
 = .34, p < .01. N+1 lures 
yielded slower reaction times compared to mismatches, F(1, 19) = 31.70, np
2
 = .62, p < 
.001, whereas n+2 lures did not, F < 1. The difference between both lure trials was also 
reliable, F(1, 19) = 16.69, np
2
 = .47, p < .01. 
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The accuracy data showed the same effects. The main effect of trial type was significant, 
F(3, 57) = 11.69, np
2
 = .38, p < .001, whereas the main effect of modality and their 
interaction were not, F(1, 19) = 2.54, np
2
 = .12, p > .10, and, F(3, 57) = 1.30, np
2
 = .06, p 
> .20, respectively. Averaged across the verbal and the visuo-spatial modalities, the data 
showed that mismatches were more accurate than matches, F(1, 19) = 14.31, np
2
 = .43, p 
< .01. The n+1 lures produced lower accuracies than the mismatches, F(1, 19) = 6.36, np
2
 
= .25, p < .05, whereas the n+2 lures did not, F < 1. The difference between both types of 
lures was reliable, F(1, 17) = 7.38, np
2
 = .30, p < .05.   
 
2-back. Reaction times in the 2-back condition showed a significant main effect of trial 
type, F(3, 57) = 47.74, np
2
 = .71, p < .001, whereas the main effect of modality and the 
interaction between both factors were not significant, both Fs < 1. Power calculations 
indicate that the test of difference between the verbal and visuo-spatial modality was 
sufficiently powerful to detect a moderate sized effect (power = .99).  Averaged across 
the verbal and the visuo-spatial modalities, F(1, 15) = 42.11, np
2
 = .74, p < .001, and both 
the n+1 and the n-1 lures slowed down performance compared to the mismatches, F(1, 
15) = 57.81, np
2
 = .79, p < .001, and, F(1, 15) = 10.72, np
2
 = .42, p < .01, respectively. 
The difference between both types of lure trials was not significant, F(1, 15) = 2.59, np
2
 = 
.15, p > .10.  
With respect to the accuracy data, the main effect of trial type was reliable, F(3, 45) = 
25.12, np
2
 = .63, p < .001, but the main effect of modality was not, F < 1. The interaction 
between modality and trial type was also reliable, F(3, 45) = 4.08, np
2
 = .21, p < .05. This 
interaction can be explained by the observation that the interference effect of the n+1 
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lures produced slightly lower accuracies in the verbal compared to the visuo-spatial 
modality, F(1, 15) = 8.35, np
2
 = .36, p < .05, whereas no such modality effect could be 
seen for the n-1 lures, F < 1.  
 
3-back. Reaction times in the 3-back version of the task differed as a function of trial 
type, F(3, 45) = 9.38, np
2
 = .38, p < .001, while the main effect of modality and the 
interaction between both factors were not significant, F(1, 15) = 2.76, np
2
 = .15, p > .10, 
and, F < 1, respectively. Power calculations indicate that the test of difference between 
the verbal and visuo-spatial modality was sufficiently powerful to detect a moderate sized 
effect (power = .99). Averaged across the verbal and the visuo-spatial modalities, there 
was no difference between matches and mismatches, F(1, 15) = 1.16, np
2
 = .07, p > .20. 
Both the n-1 and the n-2 lure trials significantly delayed performance compared to the 
mismatches, F(1, 15) = 8.77, np
2
 = .37, p < .01, and, F(1, 15) = 15.96, np
2
 = .51, p < .01, 
respectively. The difference between both kinds of lure trials was not significant, F(1, 15) 
= 2.72, np
2
 = .15, p > .10.  
With respect to the accuracy data, we observed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 
45) = 19.01, np
2
 = .56, p < .001, and of modality, F(1, 15) = 8.01, np
2
 = .35, p < .05, the 
latter indicating that accuracy was lower in the visuo-spatial modality. The interaction 
between trial type and modality was also reliable, F(3, 45) = 5.46, np
2
 = .27, p < .01. 
Planned comparisons showed that there was a main effect of trial type in the verbal 
domain, F(3, 45) = 5.92, np
2
 = .28, p < .01, and in the visuo-spatial domain, F(3, 45) = 
17.23, np
2
 = .53, p < .001. Matches were less accurate than mismatches with verbal 
materials, F(1, 15) = 12.14, np
2
 = .45, p < .01, but also with visuo-spatial materials, F(1, 
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15) = 20.27, np
2
 = .57, p < .001. N-1 lures did not affect accuracy in the verbal domain, F 
< 1, while they did in the visuo-spatial domain, F(1, 15) = 5.76, np
2
 = .27, p < .05. 
Finally, lures in the n-2 position produced reliably lower accuracy than mismatch trials in 
the visuo-spatial domain, F(1, 15) = 27.81, np
2
 = .65, p < .001, and a trend in the same 
direction in the verbal domain, F(1, 15) = 3.42, np
2
 = .18, p = .08.  
 
Discussion 
The aim of Experiments 1a and 1b was to provide a detailed description of the different 
kinds of lure interference effects that occur in the n-back updating task. In the 1-back 
variant of the task, we compared the proactive interference of lures in the n+1 and n+2 
positions. The results show that only the lure in the n+1 position affected performance. 
An item that has become irrelevant to the task can be discarded from working memory, 
and so its familiarity decreases. If the item has just been discarded (n+1 position), its 
familiarity is still high enough to cause interference. After a longer period however (n+2 
position), the item has become unfamiliar and does not interfere anymore. The 2-back 
version of the task allows us to directly compare interference caused by older items that 
are no longer relevant (n+1 lure) and recent items that are relevant for future processing 
(n-1 lure). We observed that the n-1 lure interference was larger than the n+1 lure 
interference, again in line with the idea that the amount of interference is a function of the 
familiarity (and relevance) of an item. In the 3-back variant of the task, we compared 
interference caused by lures in the n-1 and n-2 positions, and observed a reliably larger 
lure effect in the n-1 position. It is interesting to see that the oldest item, in the n-1 
position, actually produces more interference than the more recent item in the n-2 
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position. One possible explanation for this finding is that n-1 lure interference originates 
from items that are kept activated in working memory until they appear in the target n-
back position. When working memory content must be maintained for a period of time, 
people typically use rehearsal in order to protect the stored information against forgetting 
(e.g., Page & Norris, 1998; but see also Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008, for a balanced 
view on the usefulness of rehearsal in the context of forgetting). This means that an item 
in the n-1 position is likely to have been rehearsed more often than an item in the n-2 
position. Knowing that rehearsal alters the familiarity of an item (Gardiner et al., 1994), 
the stronger lure interference of the n-1 lure compared to the n-2 lure is thus possibly a 
consequence of rehearsal. This hypothesis will be tested more directly in Experiment 2. 
The same pattern of lure interference was seen in the accuracy data. The finding that 
people make more errors on a lure trial is consistent with the view that there is 
competition between familiarity and recollection, and that sometimes familiarity wins 
before the contextual information from recollection can intervene.  
Finally, we also showed that the patterns of lure interference that were found in the 
different variants of the n-back task were comparable for verbal and visuo-spatial 
stimulus materials. This means that we are not merely looking at modality-specific 
effects, which is an important prerequisite for drawing conclusions about the operation of 
a central interference control mechanism involved in updating. 
 
Experiment 2 
The results from the 3-back task used in Experiment 1 show that an older item (i.e. in n-1 
position) causes more lure interference than a more recent item (i.e. in n-2 position). 
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Knowing that familiarity decreases over time, stronger interference from an older item is 
at first sight somewhat at odds with the hypothesis that lure interference is familiarity-
based. However, it is quite unlikely that participants in an n-back task just allow the items 
in memory to degrade, and hence let the familiarity of the items decrease, because they 
still need to recognize these items once they have arrived in the n-back position. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that participants alter the level of activation of an item in 
memory through rehearsal (Page & Norris, 1998), by which the degree of familiarity
2
 
becomes affected (Gardiner et al., 1994). In order to directly test this hypothesis directly, 
we varied the interval between the presentation of successive items in the n-back task, 
based on the knowledge that with a longer inter-stimulus interval (ISI) subjects typically 
rehearse memorized materials more often (cf. Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Hockey, 1973; 
Bunting et al., 2006) in order to protect the stored contents against forgetting. 
Consequently, we predicted that familiarity of items would be higher for the long ISI 
condition than the short ISI condition because of rehearsal (Gardiner et al., 1994). If 
interference from lure trials reflects a familiarity-based erroneous response tendency, 
then lure interference effects will be larger for longer ISIs than for shorter ISIs. We tested 
this hypothesis in Experiment 2.  
 
Method 
Subjects and design 
Twenty-six first-year students (12 female; mean age: 18, range: 18 - 23), enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University participated for 
course requirements. None of them had participated in Experiments 1a and 1b. We used a 
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2 (ISI: short and long) x 4 (trial type: match, mismatch, n+1 lure and n-1 lure) within 
subjects design. The order of the ISI conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.  
 
Materials and procedure 
The same verbal contents as in Experiment 1a were used. We administered only 2-back 
lists in this experiment because this version of the n-back task enabled us to investigate 
n+ as well as n- lures. ISI was 2,000 msec in the short ISI condition and 4,000 msec in 
the long ISI condition. The two different ISI conditions were blocked. In all other 
respects, the materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1a. 
 
Results  
Reaction Times 
The mean RTs (correct trials only) for the different trial types in the short and long ISI 
conditions are illustrated in Figure 5. In the analysis of variance, we observed significant 
main effects of ISI, F(1, 25) = 4.09, np
2
 = .14, p = .05, and trial type, F(3, 75) = 56.70, np
2
 
= .69, p < .001, and a significant interaction between these two factors, F(3, 75) = 14.38, 
np
2
 = .36, p < .001. Planned comparisons show that matches were performed faster than 
mismatches, F(1, 25) = 3.96, np
2
 = .14, p = .06, and that this difference was similar for 
both ISI conditions, F < 1. We observed a reliable n+1 lure effect (i.e. difference between 
mismatch and n+1 lure trials) in both the short ISI condition, F(1, 25) = 4.70, np
2
 = .16, p 
< .05, and in the long ISI conditions, F(1, 25) = 56.35, np
2
 = .69, p < .001, and although 
this effect appeared to be stronger in the long ISI condition, F(1, 25) = 14.45, np
2
 = .37, p 
< .001. Analogously, we found a reliable n-1 lure effect, both in the short, F(1, 25) = 
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24.64, np
2
 = .50, p < .001, and in the long ISI conditions, F(1, 25) = 98.56, np
2
 = .80, p < 
.001, and this effect was also again stronger in the long ISI condition, F(1, 25) = 33.35, 
np
2
 = .57, p <  .001. Finally, the RT data showed that n+1 lure trials were performed 
faster than n-1 lure trials, F(1, 25) = 11.01, np
2
 = .31, p < .01, and this difference was 
similar for both ISI conditions, F < 1. 
 
Accuracy Data 
The mean accuracy per trial type and per ISI condition is displayed in Table 2. The 
analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 75) = 9.41, np
2
 = 
.27, p < .001. The main effect of ISI, F < 1, and the interaction between both factors, F(3, 
75) = 1.91, np
2
 = .07, p > .10, were not significant. Averaged across both ISI conditions, 
the data showed that 2-back matches and mismatches yielded a comparable level of 
accuracy, F(1, 25) = 2.34, np
2
 = .08, p > .10. Compared to the mismatch trials, the n+1 
lures, F(1, 25) = 7.39, np
2
 = .23, p < .05, as well as the n-1 lures, F(1, 25) = 7.84, np
2
 = 
.43, p < .01, produced a reliable decrease in accuracy. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, we lengthened the maintenance time of the items in the n-back task 
(i.e. longer ISI), so that subjects could rehearse those items more often. Rehearsal is 
known to increase the degree of familiarity of the stored materials (Gardiner et al., 1994). 
In line with our predictions, we observed that the lure interference effects were stronger 
for the long than for the short ISI. This provides further evidence for the theoretical 
assumption that interference during updating is a function of item familiarity. The current 
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findings with the ISI manipulation are in line with earlier findings of Bunting et al. 
(2006), who argued that a running memory span task with a short ISI is a relatively 
passive, low-effortful task, whereas with a longer ISI, it becomes an active, effortful 
updating task that calls upon rehearsal in order to conserve the memory contents. It thus 
seems that rehearsal plays a somewhat ambiguous role in updating tasks. On the one 
hand, it protects the contents of memory against forgetting over longer periods of time. 
On the other hand, it increases the familiarity of the updated items, by which their 
potential to cause interference (e.g., when they appear in the n-back lure position) 
increases. Oberauer (2009) aptly describes this paradox as follows: "In other words, 
whereas in overcoming-competition tasks i.e. pure working memory maintenance tasks, the 
WMsystem fights conflicting tendencies from external sources, in updating tasks, WM fights 
itself" (p. 72). Rehearsal in the n-back updating task may thus counteract forgetting but it 
does not seem to be a good strategy to counteract lure interference, quite the contrary. 
Although our findings are partially framed within a literature that ascribes a role to 
rehearsal in working memory maintenance, we also want to draw the reader's attention to 
the theoretical debate that is still ongoing on about the importance of rehearsal in working 
memory, for example as a strategy to counteract forgetting (e.g., Oberauer & 
Lewandowsky, 2008). It iscan thus surely be questionedable whether rehearsal is indeed 
necessary to explain the current results. Therefore, we also need to be mindful of a more 
parsimonious account of our familiarity manipulations, which assumes that higher 
familiarity for longer ISIs is a consequence of longer and thus better encoding. 
It is also worth mentioning that the reaction time differences between the short and long 
ISIs were only visible on lure trials but not on the mismatch and match trials. Because 
familiarity and recollection provide congruent information on match and mismatch trials, 
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one might also have also expected that higher familiarity leads towards faster RTs on 
match and mismatch trials. But However, the current data thus show a large impact of 
increased familiarity on lure trials but not on match and mismatch trials. Such aThis 
pattern of results suggestsimplicates that the costs of incongruent information on RT are 
greater than the benefits from congruent information, a phenomenon which is typically 
found in other interference paradigms as well (see e.g., Verbruggen & Logan, in press, 
for a more detailed account). 
Finally, the fact that n+1 and n-1 lures cause more interference with increasing ISI 
supports the idea that updating does not affect the temporal but the positional 
discriminability of the items (see also Ng & Maybery, 2002; Lewandowsky, Brown, 
Wright, & Nimmo, 2006). If the interference arose from temporal neighbors of the item 
in position n, one would expect that with longer ISI, the neighboring items would be 
further away in time, and hence the interference should be smaller. The fact that, on the 
contraryconversely, the lure interference increases with ISI is more in line with the idea 
that the lure effects arise from decreased positional discriminability, or in other words, 
from weakened bindings between an item and its position in working memory, which 
hamper recollection. In the following experiment, we will further examined the nature 
and consequences of this decreased positional discriminability. 
 
Experiment 3 
In summary [this is a rather strange lead in for the opening paragraph of a new 
experiment], we assume that updating hinders strong item-to-position bindings in 
working memory, which in turn weakens recollection. As a consequence, the recollection 
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process can not efficiently counteract the misleading familiarity signals in memory, by 
which performance is impaired. It is plausible to assume that these misleading familiarity 
signals arise from confusion amongst items that are close neighbors of the target item in 
position n, by analogy with the transposition errors that are usually seen in serial recall 
(e.g., Henson, 1999). This accommodates the observation that lures in positions n+1 and 
n-1 cause more interference than the lures that stand one position further away from n, 
i.e. n+2 and n-2, respectively.  
However, although we acknowledge that such positional reversals may occur in the n-
back task interference during updating tasks does in our view not exclusively originate 
from neighboring items. Items that are in working memory are known to automatically 
activate items in long-term memory that match them or that are associated with them, and 
these items in turn compete for being retrievedretrieval in working memory (Oberauer, 
2009). So, it is known that activated long-term memory contents try to gain access to 
working memory and, as we explained before, we assume that updating does not allow 
the strong binding (or strong recollection) that is required to shield the contents of 
working memory against proactive interference. Therefore, we hypothesize that activated 
items that have not been positioned in working memory before, and that are only related 
(e.g., semantically) to working memory contents, also have the potential to cause lure in 
interference in the n-back task. 
We tested this hypothesis using a 2-back version of the task with Dutch nouns as stimuli, 
e.g., bike - neck - house - knife. In order to increase the sensitivity of our design, we only 
focused on one type of lures in this experiment, namely the ones in the n+1 position, e.g., 
knife - neck - house - knife. These lures were chosen because they measure the 
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interference from items that are being discarded from the DA region of working memory, 
which allow a more appropriate test of proactive interference compared to items that 
must be kept activated in working memory (i.e. items in the n- position). Most 
importantly, we also included semantic lures, which are lure trials in the n+1 position that 
are semantically related to the target word, e.g., fork - neck - house - knife. Based on the 
above hypothesis that lure interference in an updating context does not only reflect item 
transpositions but also proactive interference through spreading activation in semantic 
networks, we predicted that performance on both identical and semantic lures would be 
slower and less accurate than on mismatch trials. 
 
Method 
Subjects and design 
Twenty-four first-year students (18 female; mean age: 18, range: 17 - 31), enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University participated for 
course requirements. None of them had participated in oneany of the previous 
experiments. Each participant performed the 2-back task, involving four different trial 
types: match, mismatch, n+1 identical lure and n+1 semantic lure. 
 
Materials and procedure 
Four different 2-back lists were administered to the participants, each consisting of 45 + 2 
trials. The stimuli were Dutch 1- or 2-syllable nouns taken from De Deyne & Storms 
(2008) who obtained semantic association norms for 1424 Dutch words. Each 2-back list 
contained 20 mismatch trials, 15 match trials, 5 identical n+1 lures and 5 semantic n+1 
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lures. An example of a semantic lure trial is ...pear - mouth - hat - apple... . The study of 
De Deyne and Storms (2008) shows, for example, stronger semantic priming from peear 
to apple than vice versa. For this reason, we decided to place the stimulus with the 
strongest priming properties in the lure position (pear in the example) and the most 
strongly semantically associated stimulus (apple according to De Deyne & Storms, 2008) 
in the target position. The length (number of syllables) of the two word stimuli between 
lure and target were matched across the different trial types. The stimuli were presented 
visually (48 point bold Times New Roman font) for 1500 msec, after which a fixation 
cross remained centered on the screeen for another 1500 msec (thus the ISI was 3000 
msec). The experiment was preceded by two practice lists. The other procedural 
characteristics were identical to the previous experiments. The entire procedure lasted 
approximately 40 minutes.  
 
Results  
Reaction Times 
The mean RTs (correct trials only) for the different trial types are illustrated in Figure 6. 
In the analysis of variance, we observed a significant main effect of trial type F(3, 69) = 
15.96, np
2
 = .41, p < .001. Planned comparisons showed that matches and mismatches 
were performed equally fast,F < 1. Both the identical lures and the semantic lures lead to 
slower reaction times compared to the mismatch trials, F(1, 23) = 23.72, np
2
 = .51, p < 
.001, and, F(1, 23) = 22.82, np
2
 = .50, p < .001, respectively, but the interference effect of 
the semantic lures was smaller than that of the identical lures, F(1, 23) = 8.82, np
2
 = .28, p 
< .01.  
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Accuracy Data 
The mean accuracy was .87 (SD = .07) for the match trials, .98 (SD = .02) for the 
mismatch trials, .77 (SD = .17) for the identical lures and .94 (SD = .06) for the semantic 
lures. The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 69) = 
21.46, np
2
 = .48, p < .001. Match trials yielded a lower level of accuracy than mismatch 
trials, F(1, 23) = 60.30, np
2
 = .72, p < .001. Compared to the mismatch trials, the identical 
lures, F(1, 23) = 35.36, np
2
 = .61, p < .001, as well as the semantic lures, F(1, 23) = 9.12, 
np
2
 = .28, p < .01, produced a reliable decrease in accuracy, but the mean accuracy for the 
semantic lures was reliably higher than for the identical lures, F(1, 23) = 20.46, np
2
 = .47, 
p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
The results of our third experiment clearly demonstrate that not only identical lures, but 
even lures that are merely semantically related to the items that are updated in working 
memory, impair performance on the n-back task. This finding indicates that lure 
interference in the n-back updating task does not only reflects item transposition errors 
that are typically seen in short-term memory maintenance tasks. Our semantic lure effects 
in fact show that at least part of the interference is achieved through the spreading of 
activation from working memory to long-term memory and back again, a finding that 
offers nice empirical support for Oberauer's (2009; see also Cowan, 1988, 1995) design 
for a working memory. 
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It is particularly important to note that such semantic lure interference effects have also 
been investigated before in a modified version of the Sernberg task, called the Recent 
Negatives Task (RNT; e.g., Bartha, Martin, & Jensen, 1998; Hamilton & Martin, 2007), 
which does not involve updating. In the RNT, participants are asked to memorize a 
number of items, like letters or words. Subsequently, a probe item is presented and 
participants have to respond as fast and accurately as possible whether or not the probe 
item occurred in the original stimulus set. On each consecutive trial, a new stimulus set is 
presented, so memory can be completely cleared between trials. Occasionally, lure items 
are presented which are not part of the current stimulus set n, but which were part of the 
set presented on the previous trial n-1. This proactive interference effect is very similar to 
the n+1 lure interference effect observed in the n-back task. Interestingly, Hamilton and 
Martin found that semantic lures did not affect performance in the RNT task (see also 
Bartha et al. 1998). However, only when the same task was performed by brain-damaged 
patients who have problems with binding information in working memory, did they did 
observe proactive interference from semantically related lures. By contrast, the current 
findings show that the n-back updating tasks is affected by semantic lures, even in 
healthy individuals. Altogether, these findings nicely accommodate the theoretical 
position that lure interference depends on the strength of bindings in working memory 
and that updating tasks are more sensibletive to this kind of interference because they 
require more flexible binding than pure working memory maintenance tasks.   
 
Experiment 4 
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The data from the previous experiments show that although responses are slower and less 
accurate on n-back lure trials, subjects still succeed in counteracting the lure interference 
and produce a correct response on a majority of trials. But how exactly does the cognitive 
system deal with this interference between two processes that are in competition for 
accessing the contents of working memory? We propose that the competition between the 
automatic but error prone familiarity-matching process and the consciously controlled, 
time-sensitive recollection process is diminished by prioritizing recollection over 
familiarity-matching through post-conflict, top-down behavioral adjustments. The 
Conflict Monitoring Hypothesis (CMH; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001) is an influential theoretical framework, which provides a detailed and formal 
description of how a controlled process can be prioritized over an automated process. The 
CMH assumes that the cognitive system holds a cognitive control loop, which monitors 
human information processing for suboptimal performance or interference. When 
interference is detected, it can be counteracted by top-down biasing of the task-relevant 
processing areas. The CMH control loop has been used to describe the detection and 
control of interference in many so-called response congruency paradigms, such as the 
Stroop and the Eriksen flanker task (Botvinick et al., 2001). In the Stroop task for 
example, subjects are presented color words and they are required to name the ink color 
in which these color words are written. On a proportion of trials, the ink color and the 
color word are incongruent (e.g., the word red printed in green ink) and this leads towards 
slower reaction times and more errors compared to a condition where both dimensions 
are congruent (i.e. the Stroop interference effect). Stroop interference is assumed to 
originate from a conflict between the automation of reading words and color-naming. 
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According to the CMH, this competition is diminished by selectively attending to the 
task-relevant dimension of the Stroop stimuli, i.e. the ink color, so that the color-naming 
process can be prioritized. 
We propose that a functionally similar mechanism is responsible for controlling 
interference when updating working memory. The automatic process in an n-back task 
(i.e. familiarity-matching) allows fast reactions but is more error-prone. The controlled 
process (i.e. recollection) is slower but more accurate on incongruent or interference 
trials. In order to test this control-loop hypothesis, we used a well-established effect that 
is a behavioral manifestation of the operation of the cognitive control loop put forward 
within the CMH. This effect is known as the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992). 
Gratton et al. (1992) observed that in the Eriksen flanker task, the amount of interference 
elicited by an incongruent flanker trial depends on whether the previous trial was also an 
incongruent trial or not. After an incongruent trial, the interference on a subsequent 
incongruent trial is reduced, compared to a situation where an incongruent trial follows a 
congruent trial. This effect has been replicated in other conflict tasks, such as the Stroop 
task (Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger et al., 2004), and the Simon task (Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002). The leading theoretical account of the 
Gratton effect is that it reflects top-down behavioral adjustments following cognitive 
interference (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 
2006; Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008; 2009). According to the CMH, interference is controlled by biasing the 
controlled processing route so that it can override the erroneous response tendencies 
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elicited by the automatic route. On incongruent trials, there is interference and the 
controlled process becomes prioritized; consequently, a subsequent incongruent trial will 
produce less interference (i.e. the Gratton effect). By contrast, on a congruent trial, there 
is no interference and there is no need for prioritization of the controlled process; 
consequently, a subsequent incongruent trial will produce more interference.  
In order to test the hypothesis that interference during updating is regulated in a 
functionally similar way as described by the CMH, i.e. by biasing recollection over 
familiarity-matching, Experiment 43 investigateds whether lure interference in the n-back 
updating task is also subject to a Gratton-like
3
 conflict adaptation effect.  
We tested whether the previous trial type influenced the difference between lure trials 
and mismatch trials. More specifically, we focused on 4 trial types in a 2-back task: MM 
trials (i.e. a mismatch following a mismatch), ML trials (a lure following a mismatch), 
LM trials (a mismatch following a lure), and LL trials
4
 (a lure following a lure). Based on 
the hypothesis that interference during updating is dealt with by a top-down adaptation 
mechanism, we predicted that the interference of both the n+1 and the n-1 lures will be 
smaller following another lure trial (LM versus LL) than following a mismatch trial (MM 
versus ML).     
 
Method 
Subjects, Materials and Procedure 
Twenty-eight adults (10 male; mean age: 20, range: 17 - 27) were paid €10 for 
participation. None of them had participated in any of the previous experiments. The 
materials and procedure were kept identical to Experiment 1a, unless mentioned 
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otherwise. We only used the 2-back variant of the n-back task with lures in the n+1 and 
n-1 positions. In total, 10 lists of 45 trials each were constructed. Of these 450 trials, 125 
(28%) were 2-back match trials (e.g., F−B−L−B). The remaining 325 (72%) trials were 
relevant for the conflict adaptation analyses; they are detailed in Table 3. Before the 10 
experimental lists, subjects practiced 45 2-back trials (i.e. equivalent to one list). The task 
took approximately 1 hour to complete.  
 
Results 
Reaction Times 
Reaction times were calculated for the correct trials only. In a first analysis of variance, 
we tested the effect of trial type (match, mismatch, n+1 lure and n-1 lure) in order to see 
whether we could replicate our previous findings with the 2-back task. For this analysis, 
we only looked at isolated n+1 and n-1 lure trials (i.e. not preceded by another lure trial) 
for reasons of comparability with the previous experiments. We observed a main effect of 
trial type, F(3, 81) = 22.85, np
2
 = .46, p < .001. The difference between 2-back match (M 
= 615; SD = 193) and mismatch trials (M = 650; SD = 222) was not reliable, F(1, 27) = 
2.15, np
2
 = .07, p > .10. The n+1 lure trials (M = 733; SD = 254) and n-1 lures (M = 786; 
SD = 249) produced slower reaction times compared to mismatch trials, F(1, 27) = 18.55, 
np
2
 = .41, p < .001, and F(1, 27) = 28.49, np
2
 = .51, p < .001, respectively. The difference 
between lure types was also significant, F(1, 27) = 9.96, np
2
 = .27, p < .01. 
 
Next, we analyzed the conflict adaptation results. On theoretical grounds, we do not 
expect a difference in conflict adaptation between n+1 and n-1 lures, because they are 
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both assumed to reflect a competition between familiarity and recollection. This was 
confirmed by a preliminary inspection of the data. Therefore, the data from the different 
lure types were collapsed in the following analysis. Specifically, this means that the ML 
trials and the LM trials contained the data from the n+1 and n-1 lure trials. The LL data 
comprised trials with two consecutive n+1 lures, trials with an n+1 lure preceding an n-1 
lure and trials with an n-1 lure preceding an n+1 lure. As indicated above, trials with two 
consecutive n-1 lures were not included in the analysis, because these require a “yes” 
response. Finally, the MM trials contained no lures at all. 
We conducted an analysis of variance with two within-subject factors (lure interference 
on the current trial and lure interference on the previous trial) on the mean reaction times. 
The results of this analysis are displayed in the upper half of Figure 7. We observed a 
significant overall lure effect, F(1, 27) = 18.19, np
2
 = .40, p < .001, but most importantly, 
the data show that this lure interference effect depended on whether or not interference 
occurred on the previous trial, F(1, 27) = 34.85, np
2
 = .48, p < .001. Planned comparisons 
further indicate that although there was a reliable lure interference effect after a mismatch 
trial, F(1, 27) = 51.22, np
2
 = .65, p < .001, this effect completely disappeared when the 
preceding trial was also a lure trial, F < 1. The disappearance of the lure interference 
effect when the previous trial was also a lure trial is explained by a strong tendency to 
become faster on interference trials, F(1, 27) = 3.79, np
2
 = .12, p = .06, and to become 
slower on mismatch trials, F(1, 27) = 44.84, np
2
 = .62, p < .001.  
 
Accuracy Data 
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We first tested the effect of trial type (match, mismatch, n+1 lure and n-1 lure) on 
accuracy in the 2-back task, by only looking at isolated n+1 and n-1 lure trials (i.e. the 
types ML and LM) for reasons of comparability with the previous experiments. We 
observed a main effect of trial type, F(3, 81) = 14.45, np
2
 = .35, p < .001. The difference 
between 2-back match (M = .86; SD = .12) and mismatch trials (M = .95; SD = .07) was 
also reliable, F(1, 27) = 14.10, np
2
 = .34, p < .001. The n+1 lure trials (M = .88; SD = .08) 
yielded lower accuracy scores compared to mismatch trials, F(1, 27) = 30.52, np
2
 = .53, p 
< .001. The n-1 lures (M = .82; SD = .13) also caused a reliable decrease in accuracy 
compared to the mismatch trials, F(1, 27) = 34.01, np
2
 = .56, p < .001. The difference 
between both types of lures was also reliable, F(1, 27) = 9.63, np
2
 = .26, p < .01. 
 
We then conducted an analysis of variance with two within-subject factors (lure 
interference on the current trial and lure interference on the previous trial) on the mean 
accuracy rates. The aim of this analysis was to investigate whether the top-down conflict 
adaptation effects were also reflected in the accuracy data. The results of this analysis are 
represented in the lower half of Figure 7. We observed a significant overall lure effect, 
F(1, 27) = 21.99, np
2
 = .45, p < .001, but most importantly, the data show that this lure 
interference effect depended on whether or not interference occurred on the previous 
trial, F(1, 27) = 28.97, np
2
 = .52, p < .001. Planned comparisons further indicate that 
although there was a reliable lure interference effect after a mismatch trial, F(1, 27) = 
34.93, np
2
 = .56, p < .001, this effect completely disappeared when the preceding trial was 
also a lure trial, F < 1. The disappearance of the lure interference effect when the 
previous trial was also a lure trial is explained by an increase in accuracy on lure 
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interference trials, F(1, 27) = 8.23, np
2
 = .23, p < .01, and a drop in accuracy on mismatch 
trials, F(1, 27) = 37.37, np
2
 = .58, p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 34, we tested the hypothesis that interference during working memory 
updating is diminished by prioritizing the context-sensitive recollection of the items from 
working memory, rather than to keep relying on a familiarity signal that solely reflects 
the level of activation of the items in working memory. To this end, we investigated 
whether a Gratton-like conflict adaptation effect, a behavioral phenomenon that reflects 
post-interference adjustments, also occurs after n-back lure interference. The results show 
a clear reduction in the lure interference effects when the previous trial was also a lure 
trial, compared to when the previous trial was a mismatch trial. In fact, the lure 
interference effect even disappeared completely. As can be seen in Figure 7, this is the 
result of both a post-interference acceleration on lure trials, as well as a post-interference 
slowing on mismatch trials. This finding replicates previous findings in the conflict 
adaptation literature (see e.g., Gratton et al., 1992) and fits well with the view that after a 
lure trial, the slow recollection process is prioritized over the fast familiarity-matching 
process. This will slow down performance on the following subsequent mismatch trials, 
on which the fast familiarity-matching process normally activates the correct response, 
but speed up performance on the following subsequent lure trials, on which the fast 
familiarity-matching process normally activates to the incorrect response.  
The accuracy data also support the conflict adaptation hypothesis. With respect to the lure 
trials, we observed that n-back lures were performed more accurately after another lure 
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trial than after a mismatch trial. The data for the mismatch trials show that, while 
accuracy is high for mismatch trials that are preceded by another mismatch trial, it is 
lower for mismatch trials that are preceded by a lure trial. Although this finding might 
appear to be somewhat counterintuitive (a decrease in accuracy after conflict adaptation), 
it has been found before in studies examining the Gratton effect (e.g., Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2008). This reduction in accuracy essentially shows that recollection is not 
necessarily more effective and less error-prone than familiarity matching; it is only more 
effective when conflict actually occurs (i.e. accuracy was higher for LL trials than for ML 
trials). In the absence of conflict (i.e. mismatch trials), familiarity-based matching is the 
most efficient way to access memory (i.e. accuracy was higher on MM trials than on LM 
trials). Thus even if explicit recollection from memory allows resistance to lure 
interference, it is not as efficient as familiarity-based matching in the majority of trials 
that do not involve interference.  
 
General Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the nature of the cognitive processes 
underlying working memory updating. In a series of experiments using the n-back task, 
we demonstrated that continuously updating the contents of working memory causes 
interference between relevant and irrelevant items in working memory, as evidenced by 
impaired performance on n+ and n- lure trials. We clarified the nature of this interference 
by arguing that working memory updating prevents strong binding of items to working 
memory (Oberauer, 2009) and therefore augments the sensitivity to proactive 
interference. In the n-back task, participants need to keep the balance between familiarity 
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matching and recollection in order to meet the task requirements, i.e. to respond fast and 
accurately. This means that they receive input from a fast and automatic familiarity signal 
which reveals whether or not a newly presented item is familiar or not, and from the 
explicit recollection of an item from working memory, which tells whether the newly 
presented item is in the target position n. Performance is particularly challenged when a 
conflict arises between familiarity and recollection, i.e. when the familiarity signal 
recognizes the stimulus as being familiar, but when this stimulus is in fact not in target 
position (i.e. called n-back lure trials). In order to not to be mislead on these occasions, a 
strong recollection process is required in order to overrule the conflicting information 
from the familiarity signal. However, as we explained above, items can not be strongly 
bound to working memory when they are continuously updated. Therefore, updating 
demands impair the effectiveness of the recollection process by which updating tasks like 
the n-back task become particularly sensitive to interference. This was demonstrated in 
the patterns of lure interference that were elaborated in the current series of experiments, 
and most strikingly in Experiment 3. In this experiment, we showed that even task-
irrelevant materials that are indirectly activated in long-term memory intrude working 
memory and interfere with the processing that is going on there. Theise semantic 
interference effects are uncharacteristic of the proactive interference effects that are 
usually measured in working memory maintenance tasks that do not involve updating. 
Finally, we also showed that the n-back lure interference is controlled by prioritizing 
recollection over familiarity in a way that is reminiscent of the conflict-adaptation 
mechanism described by the CMH (Botvinick et al., 2001). Our findings fit well within 
the view that protecting the contents of working memory against interference is a 
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fundamental responsibility of working memory updating (Bunting et al., 2006; Kessler & 
Meiran, 2008; Szmalec et al., 2009) and even of working memory capacity more 
generally (Engle, 2005; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Oberauer, 2005).  
 
Control of interference during updating 
The present study describes how competition between familiarity and recollection causes 
interference in the n-back updating task and how this interference is dealt with by the 
cognitive control system. Although previous studies have argued that working memory 
updating should involve a kind of interference control mechanism (e.g., Szmalec et al., 
2009) or a global process which is responsible for protecting the materials held in 
working memory against interference (Kessler & Meiran, 2008), the nature and the 
functional characteristics of this interference control mechanism has never been further 
specified. The present study showed that interference during working memory updating 
in fact seems to be counteracted by a functionally similar mechanism as the one 
responsible for the control of cognitive conflict in a variety of congruency tasks such as 
the flanker task, the Simon task, and the Stroop task (e.g., Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 
2009). When conflict is detected, controlled processing of task-relevant information is 
biased via a general adaptation mechanism (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001). Although this first 
demonstration of a Gratton-like effect in a working memory context clearly points 
towards functional similarity of interference control between working memory and 
congruency tasks, this does not necessarily imply that the same neural mechanisms is 
responsible for control of interference in both these domains (e.g., Nelson, Reuter-
Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides & Smith, 2003).  
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A schematic summary of the interference control mechanism involved in the n-back task 
is represented in Figure 8. In essence, this schema is the n-back version of a Stroop-like 
conflict monitoring model according to Botvinick et al.’s (2001) CMH. The left half of 
the figure illustrates a 2-back mismatch. In this trial, both the familiarity and recollection 
process activate the mismatch response unit, so no interference occurs. The right half of 
the figure shows a lure trial. On lure trials, the fast familiarity signal activates the match 
response unit whereas the slower recollection process activates the mismatch response 
unit, causing a conflict in the response layer. This conflict is detected by a conflict 
monitoring unit (Botvinick et al., 2001), which subsequently biases the recollection 
process in a top-down fashion so that the appropriate mismatch response can be emitted. 
Empirical evidence for this top-down biasing of recollection was provided in Experiment 
43 by means of a Gratton-like behavioral adaptation effect. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to find evidence for Gratton-like 
conflict or interference adaptation effects in the context of memory recognition processes. 
This implies that the demonstration of the Gratton effect is not restricted to congruency 
tasks, where controlled processing is required in order to make sure that subjects can 
respond on the basis of relevant stimulus features while ignoring irrelevant stimulus 
features. The control mechanism behind the Gratton effect can thus also be held 
responsible for biasing different ways to access the contents of working memory (i.e. 
recollection and familiarity). This opens new theoretical and empirical perspectives on 
the study of the relation between two major domains of cognitive science, namely 
cognitive control and memory. 
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The n-back task 
The current results also have implications for the use of the n-back task as a measure of 
working memory performance. The n-back task is currently one of the most popular 
measures of working memory in cognitive neuroscience (Kane et al., 2007), particularly 
in studies investigating the neural substrates of working memory (Owen, McMillan, 
Laird, & Bullmore, 2005; Smith & Jonides, 1997). This popularity mainly originates 
from the n-back tasks’ high face validity as a working memory task, although the studies 
that have directly investigated the relation between the n-back task and other working 
memory measures always revealed weak correlations (Kane et al., 2007; Oberauer, 
2005). The detailed n-back task analyses conducted in the current study show that the 
kind of processes that are involved in the n-back task, or in other words what the n-back 
task measures, depends heavily on whether or not the procedure contains lure trials. If 
lure trials are not involved, the task can be performed mainly by relying on familiarity 
matching without measurable requirements for explicit recall or cognitive control (see 
also Bunting et al., 2006). When the proportion of lure trials is higher, consciously 
controlled recollection of the items is privileged and cognitive control resources are 
heavily taxed in order to protect the contents of memory against interference. It is thus 
important to realize that the n-back task may be a measure of cognitive control rather 
than working memory performance, as also evidenced by its weak correlation with 
working memory measures (see Kane et al., 2007, for a more detailed discussion) but 
stronger correlation with Stroop interference (Kwong See & Ryan, 1995). Future studies 
should be aware that the presence or absence of lure trials in the n-back procedure has 
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important implications for the cognitive processes of interest: an n-back procedure with 
and one without lure trials are almost two different tasks in terms of what they measure.  
  
Working Memory Updating: Executive Function or Task? 
Finally, what do the present findings regarding interference control during updating tell 
us about the concept of executive control in working memory? Executive control was 
initially conceptualized as a single control entity, such as the Central Executive 
(Baddeley, 1986), responsible for producing goal-directed behavior. This concept was 
however so poorly specified that it seemed as if a hidden “homunculus” performed the 
critical interventions. An important theoretical step forward was made by Miyake et al. 
(2000) who questioned the unity/diversity within executive control and proposed to 
fractionate executive control in a taxonomy of separable and relatively autonomous 
executive control functions, such as inhibition, task switching or updating. Although the 
notion of autonomous executive control functions has gained much popularity over the 
years, the empirical evidence for this theoretical position is not that strong in our view. 
On the one hand, correlations between executive function tasks are generally moderate 
(e.g., Miyake et al., 2000), which can actually be interpreted as evidence for both sides of 
the unity/diversity debate. On the other hand, the fractioning program of a unitary control 
system does not seem to end with functions like updating, inhibition of shifting, since it 
seems that even more lower-level control processes, such as response selection, might be 
the primitives of executive control (e.g., Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2005; 
Szmalec, Verbruggen, Vandierendonck, De Baene, Verguts, et al., 2008).     
                                                   Cognitive interference and working memory updating 44 
In the light of the current findings, we would like to present an alternative view on 
executive control that lies somewhere in between a unitary control system and a set of 
fractionated control functions. The present data clearly suggest that the executive 
demands of the n-back updating task are strongly related to the requirement to protect 
working memory against interference during updating. This interference seems to be 
dealt with by a conflict monitoring loop which is functionally similar to the one put 
forward by the CMH (Botvinick et al., 2001) and which is presumably responsible for 
managing interference in several interference paradigms, such as the Stroop and the 
flanker paradigm (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Notebaert et al., 2006; Verbruggen et al., 
2006; see also Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007), but also in task switching (e.g., Notebaert 
& Verguts, 2008). Therefore, we believe that the empirical evidence so far provides 
strong support for the alternative view that updating, interference control or task 
switching are task demands, rather than separable executive functions (e.g., the demand 
to update a representation or to switch tasks). These task demands are met by an 
underlying conflict monitoring mechanism (cfr. CMH), operationalized by the Gratton-
effect, which monitors for suboptimal performance (or conflict, interference) in the 
cognitive system. Our view thus promotes the redefinition of a single executive control 
entity into a clearly described and well-established conflict monitoring and control loop 
that seems to operates in a variety of task contexts, rather than by a taxonomy of 
potentially separable executive functions, and herewith, it tries to explicitly unify theories 
of executive control in working memory with the cognitive control literature (see also 
Braver et al., 2007; Szmalec et al., 2009).      
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Footnotes 
1 It is still an issue of debate whether forgetting is caused by decay and/or interference 
(see Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008). Recent findings in fact show that interference has 
a much larger effect on the degradation of stimuli in short-term memory, whereas the 
effects of temporal decay appear to be very small (Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009). 
Therefore, throughout the manuscript, we used the descriptive terms "stimulus 
degradation" and "forgetting" instead of "decay". 
2 Despite of the fact that the term familiarity belongs to long-term memory in the first 
place, we would like to re-emphasize that we refer to short-term familiarity here. From 
that view, we could also have chosen to replace familiarity by its short-term counterpart 
recency. However, we decided not to do so because this study is based on the idea that 
long-term concepts like familiarity and recollection are also applicable to working 
memory (e.g., Goethe & Oberauer, 2008; Oztekin & McElree, 2007). The idea that both 
working memory and long-term memory contents are accessible through shared memory 
processes fits well with the hypothesis that working memory is just a temporarily 
activated portion of long-term memory (Cowan, 1988). 
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3 We prefer to use the term Gratton-like because the classical Gratton effect has been 
described in a context of conflict tasks that do not involve exactly the same types of trials 
as those involved in the n-back task.  
4 Because n-back match trials require a "yes" response, whereas mismatch and lure trials 
require a "no" response, we choose not to include n-back match trials in the conflict 
adaptation analysis to prevent the effects of interest from becoming confounded with 
baseline differences in reaction times between yes and no responses. 
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